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A. J. Thomas, Jr.*
I. CHOICE OF LAw-WRONGFUL DEATH
McEntire v. Forte' and Click v. Thuron Industries were wrongful death ac-
tions arising out of airplane crashes occurring in states other than the forum,
Texas. The McEntire crash occurred in New Mexico, and the widow of a Texas
passenger brought suit for herself and her children against the estate of the
pilot, who was also a Texan. The conflict of laws issue was the applicability of
the New Mexico guest statute' which prohibits recovery by a guest from the
operator of an aircraft for injuries to the guest unless the injuries resulted from
an intentional act of the operator or from his heedless or reckless disregard of
the rights of others.
In Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc.' the Supreme Court of Texas declared
emphatically that claims for wrongful death in another state are to be governed
by the laws of that state, and that the Texas wrongful death statute has no ex-
traterritorial effect so as to control results of injury or death in another state.
In Marmon the crash and death of Texas citizens had occurred in Colorado. In
order to avoid the application of the Colorado wrongful death statute, which
limited recovery to $25,000, the plaintiffs claimed application of Texas law
under the most significant contacts or relationship doctrine. The plaintiffs con-
tended that the cause of action was essentially a Texas cause of action between
parties who were domiciliaries of Texas and that, therefore, Texas law should
govern. The supreme court rejected this contention and, following the words
of the Texas statute, applied the law of Colorado as the situs of "the wrongful
act, neglect or default."'
The plaintiffs in McEntire attempted to distinguish Marmon. It was urged
that the application of Texas law was not sought to avoid a limitation of dam-
ages provision contained in a wrongful death statute at the place of the wrong.
The plaintiffs conceded that the New Mexico death statute, which has no such
limitation, should apply. But the plaintiffs argued that the aviation guest statute
should not control because the guest statute was a separate enactment not built
into the death statute. On this point, it was alleged, the most significant contacts
rule should be adopted so that Texas law rather than New Mexico law would
determine the rights of the parties.
The Texas court rejected this distinction, finding that the guest statute applies
to wrongful death cases by barring a guest's cause of action against a pilot un-
less the cause of action arises from an intentional, heedless, or reckless act. This
provision was said to control in an aviation guest case to the same extent as if
it had been written into the death statute itself. Since the Texas statute required
* B.S., Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M.,
S.J.D., University of Michigan. William Hawley Atwell Professor of Constitutional Law,
Southern Methodist University.
1463 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
2460 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970), error granted.
3 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-1-16 (1953).
4430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968).
5TEx. REV. CIrV. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (1952).
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a right to maintain an action according to the law of the foreign state, and since
no right existed by the law of New Mexico, the plaintiffs cause of action was
barred. The Court declared that in such a case a Texas court was "not at liberty
to accept one New Mexico statute and discard another in favor of a different
rule of Texas law."' Thus, because court interpretation of article 4678' com-
mands application of the law of the place of the wrong, Texas courts in wrong-
ful death cases refuse to consider adoption of the most significant contacts rule.
Under the relatively new significant relationship theory wrongful death ac-
tions are to be governed by the laws of the place of injury unless some other
state with respect to the specific issue has a more significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties. The state of domicile of the parties as well as the
place in which the relationship is centered are states that, depending upon their
interests and the purpose of policy behind their applicable laws, might well have
a more significant relationship than the state in which the injury occurred." In
McEntire the parties were domiciled in Texas and their relationship was cen-
tered in Texas since the travel relationship began in Texas and would have
ended in Texas but for the fortuitous crash in New Mexico. Under the new
theory this relationship to Texas probably overbalances the contact with New
Mexico. A New York case' has held on facts similar to those of McEntire that
when domiciliaries begin a trip in the state of domicile which is to end in the
state of domicile, the place of injury is merely fortuitous and such state has no
interest in the application of its guest statute. The purpose of such a limiting
rule was to protect insurance companies against collusion between host and
guest, and thus the place of injury could have no reason to extend its rule to
protect out-of-state insurance companies which had insured persons domiciled
in another state.
Nevertheless, the place of injury may have some interest to protect or may
have some specific purpose behind its guest statute. For example, in the case
at hand the place of injury, New Mexico, would further its interests by applying
its guest statute if the purpose of its guest rule was to protect hosts while in the
state from the ingratitude of their guests. In such an instance the court must
look at the contacts, the interests of both states and the policy behind the laws,
weigh the interests, and apply the law of the state which has the most signifi-
cant contacts or relationship. Wide latitude rests in courts making such a deter-
mination. Perhaps Texas has been wise in rejecting, at least for the present, the
new theory. As was pointed out by one court after discussion of the conflicting
viewpoints in certain cases adhering to the new theory: "[Clertainty in the law
is not so common that where it exists, it is to be lightly discarded. We recognize
"McEntire v. Forte, 463 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971), error ref.
nmr.e.ITEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (1952).
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws 5 175 (1971) (hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; see id. § 6, comments a-k, 5 145, comments a-i, for discussion
of the significant relationship theory. For an excellent short discussion of the policy values
and the conflict of laws, see R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICT OF LAws 5§ 9-16 (2d ed.
1968).
'Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). But
see Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965), where the
court reached a different conclusion because the New Yorkers' journey during which injury
occurred began and ended in another state.
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the force of the countervailing arguments, but in the present state of law, we
leave any change in established doctrine to the legislature."'"
Click was a wrongful death action growing out of an airplane
crash in Missouri. Here the specific point at issue was the applicability of the
Missouri limitation period which, if followed, would preclude suit. It was al-
ledged, among other things, that the law of Texas (which would permit the
cause of action) should control.11 It was further alleged that Texas law should
govern because Texas had the most significant relationship with the parties and
the occurrence; Missouri, other than being the place of the crash, had no con-
tacts. Moreover, the plaintiffs contended that Texas should discard the lex loci
delicti doctrine in favor of the most significant relationship doctrine. The court
rejected these contentions and followed Marmon by applying the law of the
place of injury.
Further argument was made that even under traditional doctrine the Texas
limitation provision should govern since limitation statutes are procedural and,
hence, to be governed by the law of the forum. The court admitted that normal-
ly the law of the forum applied to procedural matters, but that a well-known
exception had developed. When a statute creates the right and in the same en-
actment the time limitation for the bringing of the action is set forth, the limi-
tation bars the right itself and becomes substantive, not procedural. The Texas
court found that the Missouri wrongful death statute' was one that possessed
this "built-in" limitation period and that Missouri courts had construed it as
substantive, an inherent part of the cause of action itself. Thus, the Missouri
time limitation was applied by the Texas court to bar the cause of action.
II. JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS
Divorce Judgments. Webb v. Webb," Moody v. Moody, 4 and Diehl v. United
States"s all contained the common issue of the effect to be given to a divorce
judgment when in fact no jurisdiction, in the conflict of laws sense, existed in
the state or nation granting the divorce. Jurisdiction to grant a divorce usually
exists when one of the parties is domiciled in the divorce-granting state." In
both Moody and Diehl the parties attacking the validity of the divorce were
the parties who had sought and obtained the divorces in Nevada and in Mexico
respectively. In both cases the courts applied the doctrine of estoppel, holding
"
0 White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 355, 223 A.2d 763, 767 (1966). Counter argument
however exists, for it is pointed out that under the old vested rights doctrine there is little
certainty to be found. In applying the theory the courts have resorted to an assortment of
escape devices to avoid application of what would have seemed to be the proper law because
escape therefrom seemed desirable.
"The limitation period as prescribed by Texas law was two years in contrast to the
one-year period prevailing under Missouri law.
12Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.100 (1953).
13461 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970).
14465 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
15438 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1971).
"In Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945), Justice Frankfurter
stated that "judicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on
domicile." See also Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953). But see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) § 72 which would permit a state other than the domicile of either party to ex-
ercise jurisdiction to grant a divorce if it has some relationship with the marital status to
make it reasonable to dissolve the marriage, e.g., residence for some substantial period.
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that the party who procures an invalid divorce is estopped from later asserting
rights as a spouse. This is not to say that the divorce is a valid one based upon
valid jurisdiction. The estoppel doctrine simply prohibits the person obtaining
the divorce from denying the results of his own action.' In Webb the trial court
had held that a Mexican divorce was void and that a later marriage of the hus-
band to another woman was consequently invalid. The wife denied that she
had participated in any way or consented to the Mexican divorce. If this were
true, and in the absence of proper jurisdictional facts in Mexico, the validity of
the divorce could have been attacked by the wife." The court of civil appeals
found, however, that there was sufficient evidence to raise a fact issue for the
jury, since there was evidence indicating that the wife consented to and partici-
pated in the Mexican divorce. Such participation would make her one of the
parties invoking jurisdiction, and she would be estopped to deny the validity of
the divorce. Thus, it became necessary to reverse and remand for a new trial.
These cases might have also been decided upon the bootstraps doctrine. If both
spouses appear in divorce proceedings in a state in which there is no jurisdiction
and the jurisdictional fact of domicile is litigated in that court and found to
exist, or if there is fair opportunity to litigate the jurisdictional fact and it is not
litigated, the jurisdictional fact is res judicata. The divorce decree cannot be
made the subject of collateral attack unless the state granting the divorce would
permit such collateral attack.'
Other conflict of laws issues were presented in these cases. In Moody the hus-
band, after his unsuccessful attempt to question the validity of the Nevada di-
vorce, argued that since alimony is not permitted under Texas law after a
divorce, the Nevada judgment granting alimony was not entitled to full faith
and credit in Texas. Suits for alimony are in personam; therefore, the person
who is ordered to pay alimony must be personally subject to the jurisdiction of
the court."0 If personal jurisdiction exists, a decree is entitled to full faith and
credit if it is final and unmodifiable as to amounts due and unpaid." The court
held that the Nevada decree was valid and, as to accrued payments, that full
faith and credit must be given.
Diehl involved the enforceability of a Mexican divorce in Texas, but it also
involved certain other jurisdictional problems. In 1962 Diehl had filed suit in
a federal district court in Texas for a refund of federal income taxes. A crimi-
nal prosecution had been brought against him earlier by the Government for
tax evasion. The suit for refund was stayed pending the disposition of the crimi-
nal case. As a result of several delays secured by Diehl because of his ill health,
the criminal prosecution remained undecided at the time of his death in 1966
17 The estoppel principle is discussed in Clark, Estoppel Against Jurisdictional Attack on
Decrees of Divorce, 70 YALE L.J. 45 (1960); Weiss, A Flight on the Fantasy of Estoppel
in Foreign Divorce, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 409 (1950).
I8 See, e.g., Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rel. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279 (1945); Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.
1953).
'"Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). On the
bootstraps doctrine, see R. LEFLAR, supra note 8, at § 224.
"
0 This is the general rule. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 77. H. GOODRICH & E.
SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 277-78 (4th ed. 1964), discuss the enforcement of alimony
decrees rendered in another state.
2" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 109.'
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and, therefore, was dismissed. Mrs. Diehl then moved to be substituted as plain-
tiff in the refund suit since she had been appointed independent executrix of her
husband's estate. The motion was granted, but the Government then sought
a motion to vacate the order substituting Mrs. Diehl as independent executrix
on the ground that her application for letters testamentary in the probate court
of Harris County, Texas, was false and fraudulent. It was claimed that she had
deliberately misrepresented that Diehl was a domiciliary of Harris County at
the time of his death, and that she was his widow at the time of the filing of
proceedings in the county court. In reality Diehl was not a domiciliary of Harris
County, and a divorce had previously been obtained in Mexico. Texas law re-
quires the petition for probate to state whether the decedent had ever been di-
vorced and further declares null and void all provisions of a will affecting the
former spouse if the testator is divorced after making the will."' Texas courts
are also without jurisdiction to probate a will if the decedent is found to have
been domiciled in another state or dies outside of the state leaving no relatives
or property in Texas."2
The motion to vacate the substitution order was granted by the district court.
The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the misrepresentations to the
county court amounted to fraud so as to invalidate the judgment, since a judg-
ment procured by fraud is void and not entitled to full faith and credit. This
accords with the well-known rule that a judgment procured by fraud is entitled
to no greater faith and credit than would be granted to it in the state of its
rendition." Apparently the federal court was of the opinion that such mis-
representation in securing letters testamentary would have voided the judgment
of the Texas court under Texas law.
The court of appeals added that the jurisdictional fact for probate was
domicile and that such a jurisdictional question was open to re-examination and
attack. Since the deceased had not been domiciled in Texas at his death and
since there had been a fraudulent allegation of domicile, this fraud and lack of
domicile voided the Texas court's judgment.
A final jurisdictional issue in the case is of interest. After Mrs. Diehl had
been dismissed from the case, one Ritter, who had been appointed temporary
administrator of Diehl's estate in the Harris County court, sought to be sub-
stituted for the deceased in the federal refund case. Initially the district court
granted this motion to substitute, but later reconsidered and vacated. The court
of appeals affirmed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in the Harris County
court to appoint a legal representative. Administration is appropriate at a de-
cedent's domicile or at a place where assets of the decedent's estate are located.
Diehl was not domiciled in Texas, and the court found that there were no
assets in Texas at the time of the death. Ritter claimed that the suit instituted
for refund of income taxes from the federal government was an asset. The
court declared the general rule that ordinarily a debt may be considered as an
22 TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 69, 81 (1956).
'Probate, it is generally said, may be had at the domicile of the testator and at the situs
of any of his property, real or personal. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 8, § 201.
24 Fraud is a defense to the enforcement of a judgment of another jurisdiction. For dis-
cussion, see H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, supra note 20, at 397-98. See also Pryles, The Im.
peachment of Sister State Judgments for Fraud, 25 Sw. L.J. 697 (1970).
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asset at the domicile of the debtor," but went on to say that a different rule
prevailed with respect to debts of the Government. The Supreme Court of the
United States had held that as to debts of the United States Government, the
domicile of the creditor was the proper place for the purpose of founding ad-
ministration." Since Diehl (the creditor) was not domiciled in Texas at his
death, Texas had no jurisdiction.
Adoption. The problem of jurisdiction in an adoption proceeding confronted
a Texas court in In re Benfield.2" The natural mother of a child attacked the
validity of an adoption decree, alleging that it violated her constitutional right
of due process, and because of such invalidity was not to be accorded full faith
and credit. The grandfather had adopted the child in Arkansas and introduced
into evidence an interlocutory decree of adoption reciting proper adoption notice
and proof of publication in accordance with statutes of Arkansas. He also
presented the final adoption decree which recited absence of objection to the
adoption, coupled with a statement that the adoption was in the best interest
of the child. The mother claimed that she had not consented to the adoption,
that she had not received personal notice of the adoption proceedings, and that
she was a nonresident of Arkansas at the time of the proceedings.
The court did not discuss the question of jurisdiction for adoption in the con-
flict of laws sense, which may be based on domicile of either the adopted child
or the adoptive parent. However, if the adoption is sought at the domicile of
either the adopted child or the adoptive parent, the adoption should be granted
only when the court has personal jurisdiction over both. If jurisdiction over
the child is lacking and there is personal jurisdiction over the person having
legal custody of the child, the adoption can still take place. 8 Perhaps there
is no conflicts problem in this case if the grandfather was a domiciliary of
Arkansas and the child was also a domiciliary or personally subject to the
jurisdiction of Arkansas at the time. The facts are not clear on this point. The
Texas court, however, was concerned with the lack of jurisdiction over the non-
resident, nonconsenting natural mother. The court cited Armstrong v. Manzo,"
in which the United States Supreme Court held that failure to give notice to
a nonconsenting parent in the adoption proceeding denied due process of law.
The court distinguished Benfield on the ground that no notice of any kind was
provided in Armstrong, while here constructive notice had been given via
citation by publication in accord with the statutes of Arkansas. But is the court
correct? Cases have held that adoption proceedings can validly take place with
mere notice by publication to an absent natural parent.' It is doubtful, how-
ever, that such a viewpoint can stand under more recent cases. The Supreme
'Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919).
2 United States v. Borcherling, 185 U.S. 223 (1902); Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U.S.
654 (1884).
27468 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971).
2 On the problem of jurisdiction and adoption, see Baade, Interstate and Foreign Adop-
tion in North Carolina, 40 N.C.L. REV. 691 (1962); Taintor, Adoption in the Conflict of
Laws, 15 U. PITT. L. REV. 222 (1954). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 78.2
"380 U.S. 545 (1965), noted in 19 Sw. L.J. 417 (1965).
"
0 See cases cited in 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 70 n.5 (1962).
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Court of the United States in May v. Anderson!' held that the personal rights
of a parent could not be extinguished in a custody proceeding unless the parent
was personally subject to the jurisdiction of the court. This means that the re-
quirement of personal jurisdiction must comport with the notice requirements
of procedural due process, and apparently notice by publication would hardly
ever satisfy those requirements." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co." held that a method must be employed to give a defendant notice of the
action such that he has a reasonable opportunity to be heard. What is sufficient,
of course, depends upon the circumstances, and generally, notice other than by
publication can be effectuated. In a rare case in which no better method of
service is possible (as where a defendant is in hiding) publication might be
sufficient.'4
Long-Arm Statutes. Woodcock, Cummings, Taylor & French, Inc. v. Crosswell"
concerned a petition for writ of error by a defendant foreign corporation against
whom a default judgment was rendered by the district court. Service of process
on the defendant had been accomplished under the provisions of the Texas
long-arm statute.'" The judgment of the trial court was reversed and remanded
because proper affirmative pleadings by the plaintiff setting forth certain con-
ditions precedent to jurisdiction under the Texas long-arm statute had not been
made. Texas courts require that two conditions be met before process through
the secretary of state may be resorted to under the statute." An affirmative
pleading must be made that the nonresident defendant does not maintain a
regular place of business in Texas or have a designated agent in the state upon
whom service may be made. Here the plaintiff's complaint failed to set forth
either condition. Citing McKanna v. Edgar,"' the present court held that sub-
stituted service on the secretary of state could not confer jurisdiction in the ab-
sence of an allegation that the defendant had no designated agent or regular
place of business in Texas."
The problem of granting full faith and credit to a Kentucky default judg-
ment against a Texas corporation under the Kentucky long-arm statute was
presented in Country Clubs, Inc. v. Ward." The Texas company challenged
the enforcement of the Kentucky judgment on two grounds: (1) lack of prop-
er service of process in accord with the Kentucky statute, and (2) lack of mini-
mal contacts in Kentucky sufficient to confer jurisdiction. The Texas court
agreed that jurisdiction over the defendant Texas company in Kentucky was
31345 U.S. 528 (1953).
"Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
aId.
"RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) S 25, comment d.
'468 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971).
"TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964).
"Id. art. 2031b, §§ 2, 3.
"'388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1965).
9Note might be made of a recent decision of a United States Court of Appeals which
described the Texas rules of pleading which so strictly required allegation of the conditions
precedent, at least in an instance where the information appeared in other parts of the record,
as archaic. Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969).
40 KY. REv. STAT. § 271.610 (1969).
41461 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970), error ref. .r.e.
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wanting and that, therefore, full faith and credit need not be accorded to the
judgment.
As to the first ground, the court pointed out the general rule that for an in
personam judgment against a nonresident corporation to be valid the method
of service must strictly comply with the long-arm statute. Here there were no
allegations that the Texas corporation was doing business as a foreign corpora-
tion in Kentucky without having complied with the Kentucky statute so as to
permit designation of the secretary of state of Kentucky as its agent for service
of process in Kentucky courts for causes of action arising out of the business
done therein. Moreover, the only summons served upon the Texas corporation
was a copy of an amended supplemental complaint which did not set forth the
necessary jurisdictional allegations. Since there had not been strict compliance
with the Kentucky statute, no jurisdiction over the defendant existed.
As to the contacts of the Texas company with Kentucky, it was shown that
the company had been invited to come to Kentucky and to participate in an
apartment project. The senior vice president of the Texas company made several
trips to Kentucky and created and became president of a new corporation, Ur-
ban Properties, incorporated under the laws of Kentucky. Seventy percent of
Urban's stock was owned by the Texas corporation. After the formation of Ur-
ban Properties the Texas company had no further contacts with Kentucky or
with the project. Plaintiff's claim for services upon which the Kentucky judg-
ment was based arose after the cessation of the Texas company's activities in
Kentucky upon a contract for work and service between the Kentucky plaintiffs
and Urban Properties. The court concluded that the Texas company did not
have contacts with Kentucky prior to the consummation of the contract suf-
ficient to give rise to the cause of action upon the contract. Thus, no minimal
contacts existed upon which jurisdiction could be based. A foreign corporation
remains subject to the jurisdiction of a state in which it has done business after
its withdrawal from the state, but only as to causes of action arising from the
business which it had been engaged in within the state prior to withdrawal."
The fact that seventy percent of Urban's stock was owned by the Texas com-
pany was not thought sufficient to confer jurisdiction in Kentucky over the
Texas company. The court cited Cannon Mannufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing
Co.,' which held that jurisdiction over a subsidiary corporation does not confer
jurisdiction upon the parent. Thus, the corporate fiction was maintained. The
modern rule, however, has to some extent broken away from this concept so
that in instances in which a foreign company through its subsidiary carries on
activities in a state which give rise to a cause of action in that state, jurisdiction
over the foreign corporation may be exercised by that state under its long-arm
statute. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws states that jurisdiction
can be exercised by a state over a foreign corporation in situations in which the
corporation has a relationship to the state which makes it reasonable to exercise
jurisdiction."' As to jurisdiction over the foreign parent corporation, it is stated
that if the subsidiary does an act in the state at the direction of the parent, the
42 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) 5 48.
S267 U.S. 333 (1925).
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 5 52.
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state has jurisdiction over the foreign parent corporation.' Moreover, jurisdic-
tion over the subsidiary will give jurisdiction over the foreign parent if the
foreign parent controls and dominates the subsidiary so as to disregard the
subsidiary's independent status.46 In Country Club the Texas court refused to
follow the more modern view. In any event, the facts as presented do not indi-
cate whether the subsidiary acted at the direction of the parent in making the
contract for services or the extent of domination and control exercised by the
parent over the subsidiary.
41 Id. § 52, comment b.4 0Id.
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